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VOL. 58

RECENT CASE
EVIDENCE

-

PROSECUTION FOR SPEEDING - ADMISSIBILITY
OF ELECTRIC RADAR SPEED METER

In the recent case of State v. Moffitt,' the Superior Court of Delaware concluded that an electronic speed meter of the make and kind used in this case, if
found to be properly functioning and being operated in a proper fashion was a device that the jury could find to be a correct recorder of speed.
The facts of this case are briefly as follows: The grand jurors of Kent County
returned a true bill of indictment against the defendant charging him with having
op'erated a motor vehicle upon a highway at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, to wit, 63 miles per hour in a speed zone limited to 50
miles per hour. The state's evidence offered to substantiate its charge in relation
to the defendant's violation of the statute relating to speed, in part, consisted of
a test made by two highway troopers by the use of an electric radar speed meter,
which the state contended, if properly operated, would record the speed of a moving vehicle with a much less margin of error than the commonly recognized
2
speedometer.
The defendant objected to the introduction and admission of any evidence
concerning the operation of the speed meter. The reasons advanced by the defendant are as follows: (1) that the speed meter had never been recognized as being
a reliable instrument to record speed of a vehicle upon the highway; (2) that the
speed meter, even if admitted in evidence, standing alone8 should not be held to
constitute conclusive evidence of the speed of defendant's vehide at the time of
the test in order to warrant a conviction in the present case.
The court overruled the defendant's objection based on his first reason and
reserved decision in relation to the second reason, subject to the production of
testimony by the state. The state then produced an expert witness who testified
in detail regarding the construction, the operation and the purpose of the speed
meter, its margin of error, if properly functioning, and the ways and means of
testing its accuracy. Based upon the testimony of this expert, Judge Terry concluded that the evidence as to the accuracy of the speed meter was admissable;
and since the-speed meter that the expert used in defining the construction, operation and purpose of such meter was the same speed meter used to determine
the speed of defendant's motor vehicle, the court admitted the speed meter in evi-

l

100 A.2d 778, decision 9/23/53.
2 For cases recognizing the speedometer as competent evidence see: City of Spokane v. Knight
165 P. 105, 96 Wash. 403 (1917); Commonwealth v. Parish 10 A.2d 896, 138 Pa. Sup. 597 (1940);
Nicholas v. Penny 2 KB 466 (1950), Annotated 12 A.L.R. 2d 1200.

8 Emphasis added by the writer of this note.

RECENT CASE

dence subject to the jury's determination as to its accuracy in measuring the speed
of the defendant's vehicle under tht circumstances of the present case.
Judge Terry charged the jury, in part, as follows:
"In other words, this device as indicated, the Radar Speed Meter,
is subject, as always, to your determination of the accuracy thereof in
measuring the speed of a moving vehicle. It falls in the category of
recognized instruments 4used to determine the speed of a moving vehicle,
such as a speedometer.
In the present case, however, before you can return a verdict of
guilty under this contention-that is, a finding by reason only of the
Speed Meter-you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Speed Meter used in the present case was functioning properly, was properly operated at the time, and was in fact an accurate recorder of speed;
further, that its accuracy has been properly tested within a reasonable
time from the date of its use .... 5
If these essentials are found by you to exist, you may determine that
the Speed Meter recorded the accurate speed of the defendant's vehicle
at the time of the test on January 6, 1953, and such finding standing
alone,6 if made by you, would furnish sufficient evidence for the conviction of the defendant in the present case."7
This Delaware case, State v. Moffitt,s invites comparison with the recent New
York case of People v. Offermann9 which was decided less than a month after
the Delaware case. In the Offermann case the defendant appealed from a conviction of driving an automobile at a rate of speed greater than that permitted
by a city ordinance. The Supreme Court of Erie County held that the evidence,
which induded readings from a radar device used to measure the speed of automobiles, was not sufficient to sustain conviction.
The chief evidence offered by the state was that of the acting chief of the
Radio Division of the Buffalo Police Department. He had had no experience
with radar except to install the instrument in the police car under the direction of
his superior. The state attempted to qualify this witness as an expert. The trial
court, under its own examination, stated repeatedly that the witness was not
qualified. But still the trial court allowed this witness to testify, over the objection of the defendant, as to the construction and operation of the radar device and
permitted him to state an opinion that it was accurate.
The appellate court held that it was error to allow this witness to give an
opinion as an expert upon the accuracy of the device especially after the trial court
had repeatedly stated that the witness was not qualified.
4

100 A.2d p. 779, see also n. 2.
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7

100 A.2d p. 779.
Emphasis added by the writer of this note.
100 A.2d pp. 779, 780.

s

Ibid.

9

125 N.Y.S. 2d 179.

.
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Since a new trial was granted by the New York court, it might seem at first
glance that the New York case is contrary to the Delaware case. However this
might be, this writer contends that these two cases are in complete accord. This
writer contends that the following quoted portion of the New York opinion sustains his position.
"The legislature in its wisdom might see fit to declare that the reading of an electrical timing device similar to the one here may be admitted
in evidence as prima facie evidence of the speed of the automobile of
the accused, after such device has been certified as accurate by the authority designated by the legislature. By such legislation, the People will
be relieved of the burden of proving the accuracy of the electrical timing
device upon each trial and by expert testimony."'1
On the basis of the above language this writer contends that the conviction
of Offermann would have been upheld by the New York court if the state had
met the burden of proof by testimony of a properly qualified expert witness. The
legislation suggested by the New York court would only relieve the state of the
heavy burden of proof which it must meet under the present law and which the
prosecution failed to meet in the Offermann case. The burden of proof required
by the Delaware court is certainly just as severe. Judge Terry of the Delaware
Superior Court charged the jury as to this burden:
"You must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt" that the Speed
Meter used in the present case was functioning properly, was properly
operated at the time, and was in fact an accurate recorder of speed; further, that its accuracy has been properly tested within a reasonable time
2
from the date of its use. .
The burden of proof set forth by the Delaware court is in full accord with the
principles of criminal justice so long established in this country. This writer contends that any legislation such as that suggested by the New York court would be
contrary to these established principles.
The decision of the Delaware Superior Court has allowed the law and the
law enforcement agencies of the State of Delaware to progress with proven scientific advancements and at the same time has protected the rights of the individual
citizens by surrounding such scientific evidence with the established safeguards
of criminal prosecution.
Donald C. Taylor
Member of the Senior Class
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125 N.Y.S. 2d 185; emphasis added by the writer of this note.
Emphasis added by the writer of this note.
i0o A.2d p. 779.

